We present a complete, decidable logic for reasoning about a notion of completely trustworthy ("conclusive") evidence and its relations to justifiable (implicit) belief and knowledge, as well as to their explicit justifications. This logic makes use of a number of evidence-related notions such as availability, admissibility, and "goodness" of a piece of evidence, and is based on an innovative modification of the Fitting semantics for Artemov's Justification Logic designed to preempt Gettier-type counterexamples. We combine this with ideas from belief revision and awareness logics to provide an account for explicitly justified (defeasible) knowledge based on conclusive evidence that addresses the problem of (logical) omniscience.
Introduction
Justification Logic, due to Sergei Artemov and originally conceived as a solution to a long-standing open problem concerning the intended semantics of Gödel's provability logic [5] , has since developed into a wide-ranging study of the notions of evidence and justification, see, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29, 30, 32, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 58, 59, 61, 62] . By making explicit the "evidence" supporting a given assertion, this formalism can capture one of the main ingredients in the epistemological analysis of knowledge: the epistemic justification underlying the knowledge or belief possessed by an agent endowed with only limited logical resources and bounded rationality. As a consequence, this approach can be used to address the problem of "logical omniscience" [11, 27, 30, 41, 42, 58, 59 ] that affects other formalizations of doxastic/epistemic logic; indeed, Justification Logic is perhaps the most philosophically far-reaching and computationally sophisticated approach to this well-known problem.
Melvin Fitting's semantics [10, 28] for this logic relates in an elegant way to Kripke's wellknown relational semantics for knowledge and belief: essentially, in the Fitting semantics, a piece of evidence t justifies the belief in (or knowledge of) an assertion ϕ iff t is "admissible" for ϕ (i.e., it has the syntactic shape of a well-formed argument having ϕ as one of its conclusions) and in addition ϕ is implicitly believed/known (in the sense of Kripke's relational semantics). However, as we argued in a previous paper [13] , the Fitting semantics is "Gettierizable," by which we mean that it is vulnerable to counterexamples of the type given by Gettier in his celebrated paper [31] . Moreover, we argued in [13] that this semantics is prone to other more basic problems: it leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that an agent must accept (believe in the legitimacy of) a body of evidence t supporting an assertion ϕ only because she believes the conclusion ϕ, even if in fact her belief in ϕ has nothing to do with the evidence t. 1 In the same paper, we sketched a proposal for an alternative semantics that could address this problem.
In this paper, we build on the work in [13] by proposing a new solution to the problem of the "Gettierizability" of Fitting semantics, a solution based on introducing a notion of actual availability of "conclusive" (or "good") evidence. A conclusive body of evidence is one that is fully reliable, in the sense that it is truthful whenever it is available, and moreover all of its component pieces of evidence are similarly reliable. Intuitively, we say that the body of evidence t is "explicit good evidence" (actually available to the agent) at a world w (and write that Et holds at w) if the agent has "constructed" (i.e., computed, observed, etc.) t and if in addition t is indeed conclusive evidence at world w. Despite what the name may suggest, an agent can still be mislead about whether Et holds: she might believe some constructed evidence to be conclusive, while in fact it is not. And conversely, t can be explicit good evidence without being actually accepted by the agent: although the evidence t is available to her (say, because she has observed or constructed t), she does not believe it to be fully reliable (though in fact it is). So whether evidence is accepted (i.e., believed, or "known," to be conclusive/legitimate) is independent of whether that evidence is in fact legitimate.
We present here a static logical account for reasoning about the notions of conclusive evidence, justifiable belief (and conditional belief), defeasible knowledge, and ("hard") information. In particular, while an agent may have an implicit belief, which may be justifiable in principle by some legitimate piece of evidence that is implicitly accepted by the agent, it need not be the case that this belief is explicit: the required evidence might not be currently available to the agent (due to her computational limits or to a lack of time). Only evidence that is available to the agent (via conscious observation, explicit logical construction, or actual computation) can serve as explicit justification for the agent's beliefs. When evidence is both available to the agent and accepted as legitimate by her, then any assertion supported by it is explicitly believed : the evidence provides the agent with an explicit justification for this belief. If in addition the evidence is also known to be conclusive, then any assertion supported by it is explicitly known: the evidence provides the agent with an explicit conclusive justification for this piece of knowledge.
It will therefore be useful to distinguish between the implicit notions of belief, conditional belief, defeasible knowledge, and ("hard") information and the explicit statements that are supported by 1 More precisely, writing t : ϕ to mean that "evidence t justifies the [implicit] belief in (or knowledge of) ϕ," if the agent implicitly believes/knows ϕ (in the sense of Kripke's semantics), any evidence t admissible for ϕ is taken as a justification for the agent's (implicit) belief in (or knowledge of) ϕ (i.e., t : ϕ). In particular, the semantics does not allow for the possibility that there are two different justifications t and t for ϕ (so both t and t are admissible for ϕ), the agent (implicitly) believes/knows ϕ (in Kripke's sense), and yet the agent's belief/knowledge is based on just one of these justifications (so that only one of t : ϕ and t : ϕ is true). Accordingly, if the agent has an (implicit) (Kripkestyle) belief in (or knowledge of) ϕ, then all admissible justifications simultaneously come into play in characterizing the agent's justified (implicit) belief in (or knowledge of) ϕ, even if the agent's "real reason" for believing ϕ intuitively ought to be just one particular t . Further, an admissible justification t for a (Kripke-style, implicit) believed/known ϕ is always a justification (i.e., t : ϕ), even if in fact the agent does not believe some of the other assertions supported by t (or by some of its component pieces of evidence)! specific pieces of evidence that say why the statement in question holds. As we will see, the implicit notions are closed under logical consequence and therefore suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, wherein the notion in question simply attributes too much cognitive power to the agent, having her, for example, believe all logical consequences of her beliefs. The explicit notions, on the other hand, need not be closed under logical consequences, though generally closure will hold to some reasonable finite degree. As a result, evidence-based justified belief provides us with an account of agent reasoning that addresses logical omniscience. (We discuss this later in §5.) The work in this paper is a new development of the "static" sub-system of the logic of dynamic evidence presented in [13] . The main difference is that the logic studied here is based on the notion of conclusive evidence and, for simplicity, we restrict here to the static case (i.e., we do not address the question of how evidence and explicit evidence-based cognitive notions develop over time as a consequence of evidence-presenting informational actions such as public announcements, private messages, radical upgrades, or the like). Nevertheless, we are still able to talk about potential dynamics: conditional explicit beliefs are a way to "pre-encode" evidential changes.
The logics of the implicit cognitive notions studied here come from work by two of the authors [14] that studied these and related notions in detail. Here we take that work and, following in the spirit of the Justification Logic approach to evidence [10] and building on the setting of justifiable belief and explicitly constructable evidence from our previous work [13] , we take the first steps towards developing a new framework for formal epistemology: a theory of explicitly justified knowledge based on the actual availability of conclusive evidence.
Syntax
Definition 2.1 (Language). Given a set Φ of atomic sentences, the language L := (T , F ) consists of the set T of evidence terms t and the set F of propositional formulas (sentences) ϕ defined by the following double recursion:
An atomic term is one of the form c ϕ , also called a certificate for ϕ. A compound term is one that is non-atomic. Notation: letK denote ¬K¬, let 3 denote ¬2¬, and let ⊥ denote ¬ .
The set sub(ϕ) of subformulas of a formula ϕ is defined by induction on the construction of ϕ as follows:
, and sub(2θ) := {2θ} ∪ sub(θ). The set sub(t) of subterms of a term t is defined by induction on the construction of t as follows: sub(c ϕ ) := {c ϕ }, sub(s · u) := {s · u} ∪ sub(s) ∪ sub(u), and sub(s + u) := {s + u} ∪ sub(s) ∪ sub(u).
We think of terms as pieces of evidence that justify various formulas. The term c ϕ is an evidential certificate: a "canonical" piece of evidence in support of formula ϕ. The term t · s is a compound piece of evidence obtained by combining the two pieces of evidence t and s using Modus Ponens. The term t + s is a body of evidence that aggregates (without performing logical inference) all the evidence provided by t and by s, so that t + s supports all those things supported by one or more of t and s.
The formula t ϕ says that evidence t is admissible for ϕ, which intuitively means that: t has the formal structure of a well-formed argument, and, moreover, the structure of an argument in favor of ϕ. In other words, t "looks" like a possible justification for ϕ. Admissibility is a purely formal notion: it simply checks that t has the correct syntactic shape to qualify as an argument for ϕ. This says nothing about the validity of this possible argument, nor about its acceptance or its persuasive power. In fact, it very well might be the case that t is formally admissible for ϕ while in fact ϕ is neither true nor is it believed: the truth (or acceptance) of the conclusion ϕ depends not only on the formal correctness of the argument t but also on the truth (or acceptance) of its premises. So essentially our formula t ϕ expresses a purely syntactic meta-relation between terms and sentences. We define this meta-relation inductively on the syntax as follows: Definition 2.2. Admissibility is the smallest binary relation ⊆ T × F satisfying the following conditions:
(a) c ϕ ϕ; (b) if t (ψ ⇒ ϕ) and s ψ, then (t · s) ϕ; and (c) if t ϕ and s ψ, then (t + s) ϕ and (t + s) ψ. 2 Though we use the same word ("admissibility") and same symbol (" ") both for the just-defined syntactic meta-relation and for a symbol in our formal language (that internalizes this meta-relation in our syntax), this ambiguity is innocuous: it will be obvious from context which is which.
Note that our definition of admissibility differs in two ways from the definition that is usually adopted in the Justification Logic literature, which comes by way of the Fitting semantics [10, 28] . First, our admissibility condition for t + s differs from the usual one, in that we require both t and s to be admissible for some sentences in order for t + s to be admissible for any sentence (in which case t + s is as usual admissible for any sentence for which either t or s is admissible). This leads to our condition (c) above. In contrast, the standard Fitting condition is: (c ) if t ϕ or s ϕ, then (t + s) ϕ. The reason we choose (c) over (c ) is that we understand admissibility of t as implying that t is a well-shaped argument: for this to be the case, all its components should also be wellshaped arguments (i.e., admissible for some sentence). The second major difference from Fitting's notion is that we take admissibility as the smallest binary relation satisfying the conditions (a)-(c), whereas the traditional approach in Justification Logic (coming by way of the Fitting semantics [10, 28] ) would have us take any binary relation satisfying the conditions (a), (b), and (c ). 3 One key consequence of our departure from the traditional approach is that every compound term t that is admissible for a formula ϕ is admissible for that formula in virtue of a "derivation" of t ϕ from a finite number of assumptions of the form c ψ ψ using the conditions (b) and (c) of Definition 2.2 as "rules." It is in this sense that our notion of admissibility ensures that there is a "chain of evidence" linking the support a term t gives to a formula ϕ with a stepwise derivation from certificates. In the Fitting semantics, this is not always the case: there are Fitting models in which a compound term may be admissible for a formula ϕ without the proper subterms of t being admissible for any formula. This breaks the "chain of evidence," in that the support given by t to ϕ has nothing to do with the support given by the proper subterms of t to any other formulas. In our setting, such a possibility is expressly forbidden: first, if t supports ϕ, then, according to our rules, every proper subterm of t supports (and hence is admissible for) some formula; and second, if t supports ϕ, then there exists a stepwise "evidential chain" that begins with a finite number of certificates, ends with t itself, and includes at each intermediary step only subterms of t supporting formulas that are relevant for the derivation of ϕ.
Let us explain in more detail our admissibility conditions. We have c ϕ ϕ because certificates by definition are meant to certify: so c ϕ does have the right syntactic shape of a justification for ϕ (even though this justification might not be valid or accepted). t·s denotes an argument constructed from t and s by applying a Modus Ponens step, so that t · s is a well-formed argument for ϕ iff there exists a sentence ψ such that t is a well-formed argument for ψ ⇒ ϕ and s is a well-formed argument for ψ. Finally, t + s is obtained by aggregating two well-formed arguments. Definition 2.3 (Content). For every term t ∈ T , we define the content con t of t as the set of all the formulas for which t is admissible evidence:
When convenient, we will write con t as con(t).
Definition 2.4. T e := {t ∈ T | con t = ∅} is the set of admissible terms.
Lemma 2.5 (Computability of Admissibility). The map t → con t of type T → ℘(F ) is computable, and con t is finite for every t ∈ T .
We note that T e = T since con(c · c ⇒ ) = ∅. 4 If t ∈ T − T e , we have con t = .
Otherwise, if t ∈ T e , then Lemma 2.5 implies con t is a finite conjunction and hence a formula. The formula con t characterizes the content of term t. The content may be thought of as the information that the evidence term can reasonably be construed to support.
A key concept in our theory is the explicit availability of good evidence Et ("explicit goodness" for short). This means that t is a truth-based body of evidence that is explicitly available to the agent. In other words, "explicit goodness" Et comprises two conditions: (i) the agent has actually observed (via correct, sound observations) all the basic pieces of evidence used as premises in the argument t (so that these premises are true and available to the agent); and
(ii) the agent has actually constructed the argument t.
Since Et is meant to indicate legitimacy of use, we will require in the semantics that every explicitly good evidence term s has true content con s , a condition we call "evidential goodness." It is equally important to note what is not implied by our notion of explicit goodness. Indeed, Et may hold, while we may also have: (i ) the agent may not believe her own observations (of the above-mentioned basic pieces of evidence) to be reliable, or, even if she believes them to be so, she may not know them to be so (but instead has doubts concerning her observations); (ii ) the agent may have used the correct premises in an incorrect way by constructing a poorly shaped argument t (that may contain parts that are not formally correct and hence are not admissible for any sentence).
We use the formula Kϕ to say that ϕ follows from the "hard" information the agent has received, so that the dual formulaKϕ says that ϕ is consistent with the "hard" information the agent has received. One may consider K as a form of knowledge, though not the kind of knowledge that is usually possessed by actual, real-life agents. This sort of knowledge can be thought of as "implicit" (since it does not have anything to do with the agent's mental state, but only with what implicitly follows from her information). It is also unrevisable, as well as "infallible": it cannot be defeated in any way and it cannot fail to be true. The best term for K is thus "information" (or "hard information") rather than "knowledge."
In contrast, the formula 2ϕ captures a more realistic (though still implicit or potential) notion of knowledge: "the agent defeasibly knows ϕ." This is an embodiment of the so-called Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge, championed mainly by Lehrer [45, 46, 47] : ϕ is implicitly "known" in this sense if it is implicitly believed and would continue to be implicitly believed upon receipt of any further truthful information. So 2 refers to an implicit form of "robust" belief: one that cannot be defeated by any truthful evidence. 5 Defeasible knowledge is always taken with respect to the information the agent has received. Therefore, everything consistent with the agent's defeasible knowledge is also consistent with the information she has received: 3ϕ ⇒Kϕ.
As already mentioned, 2 is still an implicit or potential kind of "knowledge": the agent has access to it in principle but may fail to explicitly possess it. We will later combine 2 with the explicit availability of good evidence to capture an explicit (or "conscious") type of defeasible knowledge: 2 e ϕ means that the agent actually knows ϕ. Definition 2.6. We introduce the following abbreviations:
Intuitively, Bϕ means that the agent implicitly believes ϕ; i.e., that ϕ follows from some of the agent's beliefs. The usual Grove semantics of belief in plausibility models [14] makes Bϕ equivalent to the statement that ϕ is true in all the most plausible worlds. Note that in our logic, B is defined as a simple abbreviation for 32. As shown later, in our intended ("standard") models, the meaning of this abbreviation matches the usual Grove semantics. 6 Similar comments apply to conditional belief. Intuitively, B(ϕ|ψ) says that the agent implicitly believes ϕ conditional on ψ; i.e., ϕ follows from the agent's beliefs about what would be the case if ψ turned out to be the case. The usual semantics of conditional belief in plausibility models [14] makes B(ϕ|ψ) equivalent to the statement that ϕ is true in all the most plausible ψ-worlds. Once again, the meaning of conditional belief in our setting will be seen to match the usual semantics in standard models.
Among the abbreviations introduced above, there are two key higher-level evidential concepts: the twin concepts of
• justification of ϕ by implicit conclusive evidence t (written t : ϕ) and
• justification of ϕ by explicit conclusive evidence t (written t : e ϕ).
The first, t : ϕ, captures the fact that t is an entirely correct argument for ϕ: not only does t have the correct shape of an argument supporting ϕ (i.e., we have t ϕ), but t is also based only on correct (i.e., true) premises (i.e., we have c θ ∈sub(t) θ). But while t may be an entirely correct argument for ϕ (i.e., t : ϕ is true), this argument may nevertheless be unavailable to the agent either because the premises are not known to her or because she did not yet succeed in constructing this argument (due to her bounded computational-logical resources or simply due to a lack of time). If in addition to t : ϕ we also have evidential goodness Et (and so in particular the argument t and its premises are actually available to the agent), then t qualifies as "explicit conclusive evidence"; i.e., we have t : e ϕ.
Finally, the abbreviations B e ϕ, B e (ϕ|ψ), 2 e ϕ, and K e ϕ capture the agent's explicit doxastic/epistemic attitudes: the explicit, conscious possession of belief, conditional belief, defeasible knowledge, and hard information. For example, B e ϕ := B(Ec ϕ ) says that the agent believes she is in actual possession of the good evidence c ϕ . If this is so, then, in virtue of the goodness of this evidence, she must believe that the evidential content con(c ϕ ) = ϕ is true. The agent therefore implicitly believes ϕ on the basis of the certificate c ϕ , which she implicitly believes she actually possesses. For present purposes, this is tantamount to the agent having an explicit, conscious possession of a belief of ϕ. A similar discussion goes with each of B e (ϕ|ψ), 2 e ϕ, and K e ϕ.
Semantics
Definition 3.1 (Pre-model). A pre-model M = (W, · , ∼, ≥, E) is a structure consisting of a nonempty set W of possible worlds, a valuation map · : Φ → ℘(W ), binary relations ∼ and ≥ on W , and a good-evidence availability map E : W → ℘(T ). The components of the structure M must satisfy the following conditions:
• ∼ is an equivalence relation and ≥ is a preorder. 7 w ∼ v says, "w and v cannot be distinguished under the currently available information." 6 Another way to think of the abbreviation Bϕ := 32ϕ is the following: implicit belief Bϕ is defeasible knowledge that is "good enough," by which we mean that, though the agent does not defeasibly know ϕ outright, it is at least consistent with her defeasible knowledge that she defeasibly knows ϕ.
7 A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. For a preorder ≥, we denote by > the strict version given by w > v := (w ≥ v) ∧ (v w). We denote by ≤ and < the converse relations.
w ≥ v says, "w is no more plausible than v." Intuitively, it is the "smaller" worlds that are more plausible: w > v says that v is strictly more plausible than w. We define the equi-plausibility relation := ≥ ∩ ≤, so that w v if and only if (w ≥ v) ∧ (w ≤ v).
• Local Connectedness:
Worlds consistent with the information received are always comparable in terms of plausibility.
• Indefeasibility: w ≥ v ⇒ w ∼ v.
Worlds consistent with defeasible knowledge are consistent with the information received.
• Trivial Evidence: c ∈ E(w).
The agent always has some good evidence available: she has available the certificate for the trivial tautology .
• Certification of Evidence: If t ∈ E(w) and t ϕ, then c ϕ ∈ E(w).
All good available evidence is certified.
• Subterm Closure: If t · s ∈ E(w) or t + s ∈ E(w), then t, s ∈ E(w).
If an evidential term is available as good evidence, then so are its subterms.
• Availability of Evidence:
-If t · s ∈ E(w), w ∼ w , and t, s ∈ E(w ), then t · s ∈ E(w ).
-If t + s ∈ E(w), w ∼ w , and t, s ∈ E(w ), then t + s ∈ E(w ).
If an evidential term is actually available as good evidence, then this fact follows from the agent's information together with the goodness of its subterms.
The last condition can be justified by our analysis of E in terms of "goodness" (or "conclusiveness") plus actual availability (i.e., constructibility, observability, or actual "possession" of the evidence). The intuition is that availability is potentially introspective: the agent has implicit information about which arguments she has constructed/observed (regardless of whether she is explicitly aware of this). So, if a composite argument of the form t + s (or t · s) is really available to her as good evidence, then its availability is implicit information, though its "goodness" might not be. But as a consequence, the agent implicitly "knows" that if the constituent parts t and s are good, then the whole argument is good.
A pointed pre-model is a pair (M, w) consisting of a pre-model M and a designated world w in M called the "actual world." Definition 3.2 (Truth). We now define a satisfaction relation (M, w) |= ϕ between pointed premodels (M, w) and formulas ϕ ∈ F . We also denote (M, w) |= ϕ in the more familiar way by
We extend the valuation map · to all formulas by setting ϕ := {w ∈ W | w |= ϕ}.
A first observation is that, although our syntactic definitions of belief Bϕ and conditional belief B(ϕ|ψ) look very different, the first is semantically equivalent to a special case of the second:
In every pre-model, we have that:
Proof. Suppose w |= Bϕ. This means w |= 32ϕ, which implies that there is a v ≤ w such that
We want to show that w |= B(ϕ| ); that is, that
Since w ∼ w and w |= , we have w |=K and hence, to complete the argument, it suffices by (2) for us to show that
By (1), it follows that v |= 2ϕ and hence (as is readily verified) that v |= ∧ 2( ⇒ ϕ). Applying the latter to the fact that v ≤ w implies v ∼ w, we have (3). For the converse direction, suppose w |= B(ϕ| ), which means that (2). Since w |=K , it follows that (3). The latter means that there is a v ∼ w such that v |= ∧ 2( ⇒ ϕ), which itself implies (1). There are two cases to consider: v ≤ w and v w. Now if v ≤ w, then it follows by (1) that w |= 32ϕ (i.e., that w |= Bϕ), and we are done. So suppose that v w. Since v ∼ w, we have w < v. But every u ≤ w then satisfies u ≤ v and hence we have by (1) that w |= 2ϕ. Since w ≤ w, it again follows that w |= 32ϕ (i.e., that w |= B(ϕ)).
The second observation is that, if we restrict our pre-models to the ones matching Grove's standard assumptions about plausibility [33] , our notion of (conditional) belief is semantically equivalent to the Grove's well-known (and very natural) definition of (conditional) belief B(ϕ|ψ) as "truth in the most plausible ψ-worlds (that are indistinguishable from the actual world)": Definition 3.4. The Best Worlds Assumption is the statement that for every nonempty set P ⊆ W of informationally indistinguishable worlds (i.e., such that w ∼ w for all w, w ∈ P ), the set min P := {w ∈ P | w ≤ w for all w ∈ P } (consisting of the most plausible worlds in P ) is also non-empty.
Proposition 3.5. Let M be a pre-model satisfying the Best Worlds Assumption. Then we have that:
w |= B(ϕ|ψ) iff min{w ∈ ψ | w ∼ w} ⊆ ϕ .
Proof. Define the set [w|ψ] := {w ∈ ψ | w ∼ w} .
Assume w |= B(ϕ|ψ). This means
We want to show that min[w|ψ] ⊆ ϕ . We may assume that min[w|ψ] = ∅, for otherwise the desired subset relationship follows immediately. So choose an arbitrary v ∈ min[w|ψ]. That v is a member of this set means
v |= ψ , and (6) u ∼ w and u |= ψ implies v ≤ u .
Since v ∈ min[w|ψ] was chosen arbitrary, to show min[w|ψ] ⊆ ϕ , it suffices for us to show that v |= ϕ. Proceeding, it follows by (5) and (6) that w |=Kψ. Therefore, it follows by (4) that there is a u ∼ w such that u |= ψ ∧ 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ) .
Since u ∼ w and u |= ψ, it follows by (7) that v ≤ u. Since u |= 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ) and v ≤ u, it follows that v |= ψ ⇒ ϕ and therefore by (6) that v |= ϕ.
For the converse direction, we assume that
and prove that w |= B(ϕ|ψ); that is, we wish to prove that (4). So suppose w |=Kψ. This means that there is a w ∼ w such that w |= ψ. Hence [w|ψ] = ∅. Applying the Best Worlds Assumption, there is a v ∈ min[w|ψ]. But then we have (5), (6), and (7). Now if u ≤ v satisfies u |= ψ, then u ∼ v ∼ w, so u ∼ w, and hence u ∈ min[w|ψ], which implies u |= ϕ by (8) . That is, we have shown that v |= 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ). Combining this with (5) and (6), we have shown that w |=K(ψ ∧ 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ)).
Since this was shown under the assumption that w |=Kψ, our overall argument proves (4), which is it what it means to have w |= B(ϕ|ψ).
Some authors (including Grove himself [33] ) assumed a weaker version of the Best Worlds Assumption, covering only the sets P that are definable by some sentence ψ in their language (i.e., P = ψ for some formula ψ). Indeed, it is easy to see that the Best Worlds Assumption can be replaced in Proposition 3.5 by this weaker condition [14] . However, in this paper, we will consider an even stronger (but mathematically simpler) condition called standardness:
is said to be standard if the strict converse-plausibility relation < is well-founded. This means that there are no infinite chains w 0 > w 1 > w 2 > · · · of more and more plausible worlds.
Note that every standard pre-model satisfies the Best Worlds Assumption.
Definition 3.7 (Model, Evidential Goodness, Validity). A model is a pre-model satisfying the following property.
• Evidential Goodness: If c ϕ ∈ E(w), then w |= ϕ.
This says that basic pieces of evidence (i.e., certificates) that are available as good evidence are indeed "good" (or "conclusive"): what they certify is true.
Validity |= ϕ means that (M, w) |= ϕ for every standard pointed model (M, w).
Proposition 3.8 (Good Evidence). Every term t that is available as good evidence is indeed "good" (i.e., its content is true); that is,
In particular, Ec ϕ ⇒ ϕ is valid.
Proof. By induction on the construction of t. In the base case, t = c ϕ and con(c ϕ ) = ϕ. So we want to show that |= Ec ϕ ⇒ ϕ. Proceeding, let M be a model for which w |= M Ec ϕ . This means c ϕ ∈ E(w). Since M is a model, it follows by Evidential Goodness that w |= M ϕ, as desired.
Inductive step t = u · v. We have
Therefore, let us consider the case con(u · v) = ∅. It suffices for us to show that |= E(u · v) ⇒ ψ for an arbitrarily chosen ψ ∈ con(u · v). Proceeding with such a choice of ψ along with a ϕ (guaranteed by the membership ψ ∈ con(u · v)) satisfying u (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and v ϕ, let M be a model for which w |= M E(u · v). This means u · v ∈ E(w), from which it follows by Subterm Closure that u, v ∈ E(w). By Certification of Evidence, we have c ϕ⇒ψ , c ϕ ∈ E(w). Since M is a model, it follows by Evidential Goodness that w |= M ϕ ⇒ ψ and w |= M ϕ, and hence w |= M ψ, as desired. Inductive step t = u + v. We have con(u + v) = {ϕ | ∃ψ : u ϕ and v ψ} ∪ {ϕ | ∃ψ : v ϕ and u ψ} .
If con(u + v) = ∅, so that con(u + v) = , the result |= E(u + v) ⇒ con(u + v) follows immediately. So assume con(u + v) = ∅ and choose an arbitrary ϕ ∈ con(u + v). We wish to show
By Subterm Closure, we have u, v ∈ E(w). Since ϕ ∈ con(u + v), either we have both u ϕ and v ψ for some ψ or else we have both v ϕ and u ψ for some ψ. In either case, it follows by u, v ∈ E(w) and Certification of Evidence that c ϕ ∈ E(w). Since M is a model, it follows by Evidential Goodness that w |= M ϕ, as desired.
As suggested by our definition of validity (Definition 3.7), standard models are our intended models. All the other notions of (pre-)model introduced above are only auxiliary concepts (though of course all the equivalences proved above for these more general notions of model will still hold for standard models). So it is important to point out that our notion of validity is non-trivial: Proposition 3.9 (Non-triviality). There exists a standard model.
Proof. Define M = ({w}, · , ∼, ≥, E) by w ∼ w, w ≥ w, r := {w} for all r ∈ Φ, and E(w) := {c }. Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence and ≥ is a preorder. Also, it is not difficult to check that M satisfies each of Local Connectedness, Indefeasibility, Trivial Evidence, Certification of Evidence, Subterm Closure, Availability of Evidence, Standardness, and Evidential Goodness.
Defeasible Knowledge
Note our definition of 2 as "truth at all the worlds that are at least as plausible as the actual world" (Definition 3.2). This formalization of defeasible knowledge in terms of plausibility orders is due to Stalnaker [54, 55] . This notion was further studied in [14] by two of the authors, who provided a complete axiomatization of the logic K2 of defeasible knowledge and hard information, and showed that other doxastic notions (such as belief, conditional belief, and strong belief) are definable in this logic. Our axiomatic system in this paper is an extension of that axiomatization.
At a first sight, our formal definition of 2 looks very different from our above informal explanation of defeasible knowledge as "belief that cannot be defeated by any true information." However, it is easy to see that the two are equivalent: Proposition 3.10. In every pre-model, we have that:
w |= 2ϕ iff w |= B(ϕ|ψ) for all ψ such that w |= ψ .
Proof. Assume w |= 2ϕ. Choose an arbitrary ψ satisfying w |= ψ. We wish to show that w |= B(ϕ|ψ), which means w |=Kψ ⇒K(ψ ∧ 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ)) .
Since w |= ψ and w ∼ w, it suffices to show that w |= 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ). But w |= 2ϕ implies w |= 2(ψ ⇒ ϕ), and so the result follows. For the converse direction, assume that w |= B(ϕ|ψ) for all formulas ψ such that w |= ψ. We wish to show that w |= 2ϕ. Toward a contradiction, suppose that w |= 2ϕ, so w |= ¬2ϕ. By our initial assumption, it follows that w |= B(ϕ|¬2ϕ). That is,
Since w ∼ w and w |= ¬2ϕ, it follows that w |=K¬2ϕ and hence that
This means that there is a v ∼ w such that
But this implies that there is a u ≤ v such that u |= ¬ϕ. Therefore, since u ≤ u, it follows that u |= ¬2ϕ. But u ≤ v and so it follows by (9) that u |= ¬2ϕ ⇒ ϕ, from which it follows by u |= ¬2ϕ that u |= ϕ. Hence u |= ¬ϕ and u |= ϕ, a contradiction. We conclude that our assumption w |= 2ϕ must have been incorrect and therefore that we in fact must have w |= 2ϕ, as desired.
We can also prove an explicit analogue of Proposition 3.10:
Proposition 3.11. In every pre-model, we have that:
w |= 2 e ϕ iff w |= B e (ϕ|ψ) for all ψ such that w |= ψ .
Proof. By Definition 2.6, we have w |= 2 e ϕ iff w |= 2(Ec ϕ ). By Proposition 3.10, this is equivalent to the statement that w |= B(Ec ϕ |ψ) holds for all ψ such that w |= ψ. So the desired equivalence follows because B e (ϕ|ψ) := B(Ec ϕ |ψ).
Proposition 3.11 shows that 2 e really captures the notion of explicit defeasible knowledge, as intended. Table 1 lists a number of validities and non-validities. We divide this table into a number of "blocks" using horizontal lines. The first block in the table concerns the Application axiom from Justification Logic [10] :
Relationship to Certain Justification Logic Principles
In our setting, Application is valid only in its implicit justification form (using formulas u : χ); the explicit justification form (using formulas u : e χ) is not valid. The second validity in the first block of the table tells us why this is so: in order for us to have t · s as explicit justification for ψ, not only must we have that s is explicit justification for some ϕ and that t is explicit justification for ϕ ⇒ ψ, but we must also have that the combined evidence t·s is actually available to the agent. This makes sense: the explicit justifications t and s are also implicit justifications for their respective formulas and implicit justification is closed under Modus Ponens via our operation t · s; but to transform the implicit justification t · s for ψ into an explicit one, the agent must have evidence t · s actually available to her. The second block in Table 1 concerns the Sum axiom from Justification Logic [10] , t : ϕ ∨ s : ϕ ⇒ (t + s) : ϕ, which is often stated as two axioms: Note that our language does not contain the term-forming operator !. Roughly speaking, in Justification Logic the role of the evidence !t is to "check" whether t is indeed a justification of ϕ. Though we do not have this evidence operator in our language, we can simulate it using the term !(t, ϕ) defined by the abbreviation in Table 1 . Note that our "checker" term !(t, ϕ), unlike the original !t from Justification Logic, requires the formula ϕ that we are checking as a parameter. Our version of Positive Introspection appears as the first axiom in the third block of Table 1 . As for Application and Sum, the explicit version of Positive Introspection (the non-validity in the third block) is not valid; the valid version (the second validity in the third block) requires that the agent actually have the "explicit checker" ! e (t, ϕ) available to her. The fourth block in Table 1 concerns the Negative Introspection axiom of Justification Logic [10] :
¬t : ϕ ⇒ ?t : (¬t : ϕ) .
As for the "(positive) checker" operator !, our language does not contain the "negative checker" operator ?. Roughly speaking, in Justification Logic the role of the evidence ?t is to validate the failure of term t to justify ϕ. As for the positive checker, we can simulate the negative checker operator using the term ?(t, ϕ) defined by abbreviation in Table 1 . We note that our negative checker ?(t, ϕ) also differs from its original in that ours requires the formula ϕ as a parameter. Our version of Negative Introspection appears as the first axiom in the fourth block of Table 1 . As for Application, Sum, and Positive Introspection, the explicit version of Negative Introspection (the non-validity in the fourth block) is not valid; the valid version (the second validity in the fourth block) requires that the agent actually have the "explicit negative checker" ? e (t, ϕ) available to her. The fifth block in Table 1 concerns the Factivity axiom of Justification Logic [10] :
Both the implicit and explicit forms of this axiom are valid in our setting, which follows our original intention: evidence for ϕ is always good (or conclusive). Further, t : e ϕ implies not only ϕ but also t : ϕ (since explicit justification implies implicit justification) and Ec ϕ (since the explicit justification t for ϕ is certified by the explicitly available certificate c ϕ ).
The validities in the sixth block of Table 1 posit natural relationships between implicit and explicit attitudes for each of the attitudes of belief, defeasible knowledge, and the possession of "hard" information. In particular, these validities tell us that if the agent has the attitude implicitly with respect to an explicit justification she has for ϕ, then she has the attitude explicitly with respect to ϕ. The validities in the seventh block of Table 1 describe a natural reverse relationship between the implicit and explicit attitudes: if the agent has the attitude explicitly with respect to ϕ, then she also has the attitude implicitly with respect to ϕ. Proposition 3.12. Regarding Table 1 : each of the claimed validities is valid, and each of the claimed non-validities is not.
Proof. We address only the validities. Verification of the non-validities is straightforward.
Assume w |= t : (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and w |= s : ϕ. This means
w |= s ϕ ∧ c θ ∈sub(s) θ .
It follows from w |= t (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and w |= s ϕ that w |= (t · s) ϕ. Since
it follows that c θ ∈ sub(t) ∪ sub(s) iff c θ ∈ sub(t · s) and hence we have by (10) and (11) that w |= c θ ∈sub(t·s) θ. Conclusion: w |= (t · s) : ψ.
•
It follows from w |= t ϕ and w |= s ψ that w |= (t + s) ϕ. Since
it follows that c θ ∈ sub(t) ∪ sub(s) iff c θ ∈ sub(t + s) and hence we have by (12) and (13) that w |= c θ ∈sub(t+s) θ. Conclusion: w |= (t + s) : ϕ.
The argument for Explicit Left Sum follows by the abbreviation u : e θ := Eu ∧ u : θ and the result for Left Sum similar to the way in which the argument for Explicit Application followed by the same abbreviation and the result for Application. The arguments for Right Sum and Explicit Right Sum are similar.
• t : ϕ ⇒ !(t, ϕ) : (t : ϕ) (Positive Introspection) Assume |= t : ϕ. Note that since !(t, ϕ) := c t : ϕ , we have (by Definition 2.2) that w |= !(t, ϕ) (t : ϕ). Now, we have c θ ∈ sub(!(t, ϕ)) = sub(c t : ϕ ) = {c t : ϕ } iff θ = t : ϕ. Hence w |= c θ ∈sub(!(t,ϕ)) θ iff w |= t : ϕ, but w |= t : ϕ holds by assumption. We have therefore shown that w |= !(t, ϕ) (t : ϕ) ∧ c θ ∈sub(!(t,ϕ)) θ , which means w |= !(t, ϕ) : (t : ϕ).
• t : e ϕ ∧ E! e (t, ϕ) ⇒ ! e (t, ϕ) : e (t : e ϕ) (Explicit Positive Introspection)
Assume w |= t : e ϕ ∧ E! e (t, ϕ). Since ! e (t, ϕ) := c t : e ϕ and c θ ∈ sub(! e (t, ϕ)) = sub(c t : e ϕ ) = {c t : e ϕ } iff θ = t : e ϕ, it follows by an argument like that for Positive Introspection that we have w |= ! e (t, ϕ) : (t : e ϕ). But since we also have that w |= E! e (t, ϕ), it follows that w |= ! e (t, ϕ) : e (t : e ϕ), as desired.
• ¬t : ϕ ⇒ ?(t, ϕ) : (¬t : ϕ) (Negative Introspection)
Assume w |= ¬t : ϕ. Since ?(t, ϕ) := c ¬t : ϕ and c θ ∈ sub(?(t, ϕ)) = sub(c ¬t : ϕ ) = {c ¬t : ϕ } iff θ = ¬t : ϕ, it follows by an argument like that for Positive Introspection that we have w |= ?(t, ϕ) : (¬t : ϕ).
e (t, ϕ), it follows that w |= ? e (t, ϕ) : e (¬t : e ϕ), as desired.
• |= t : ϕ ⇒ ϕ (Factivity)
By induction on the construction of t. Proceeding with the base case, where t = c ψ , we assume that w |= c ψ : ϕ. This means w |= (c ψ ϕ) ∧ ψ. Since w |= c ψ ϕ iff ψ = ϕ, the result follows. We now proceed to the induction step: we assume that Factivity holds for all strict subterms of t and prove that Factivity holds for t itself. There are two cases to consider: t = u · v and t = u + v. For the case t = u · v, we assume w |= (u · v) : ϕ. This means
Now w |= (u · v) ϕ iff there exists a ψ such that w |= u (ψ ⇒ ϕ) and w |= v ψ. Further, since sub(u) ⊆ sub(u · v) and sub(v) ⊆ sub(u · v), it follows by (14) that w |= c θ ∈sub(u) θ and w |= c θ ∈sub(v) θ. But then w |= u : (ψ ⇒ ϕ) and w |= v : ψ, and hence w |= ψ ⇒ ϕ and w |= ψ by the induction hypothesis for u and for v. Hence w |= ϕ, which completes the argument for the case t = u · v. What remains is the case t = u + v. We proceed by assuming that w |= (u + v) : ϕ, which means
We have w |= (u + v) ϕ iff there exists a ψ such that, without loss of generality, w |= u ϕ and w |= v ψ. Since sub(u) ⊆ sub(u + v), it follows by (15) that w |= c θ ∈sub(u) θ. Hence w |= u : ϕ. Applying the induction hypothesis for u, we conclude that w |= ϕ, as desired.
• |= t : e ϕ ⇒ ϕ ∧ t : ϕ ∧ Ec ϕ (Explicit Factivity) That |= t : e ϕ ⇒ t : ϕ follows because t : e ϕ := Et∧t : ϕ (Definition 2.6). Hence |= t : e ϕ ⇒ ϕ by Factivity. So all that remains is to show that |= t : e ϕ ⇒ Ec ϕ . Proceeding, assume w |= t : e ϕ. This means
But it follows from w |= Et∧t ϕ by Certification of Evidence (Definition 3.1) that w |= Ec ϕ . Hence |= t : e ϕ ⇒ Ec ϕ .
• |= B(t : e ϕ) ⇒ B e ϕ, |= 2(t : e ϕ) ⇒ 2 e ϕ, and |= K(t : e ϕ) ⇒ K e ϕ.
These follow by our abbreviations (Definition 2.6) using Explicit Factivity. For example, let us show that |= B(t : e ϕ) ⇒ B e ϕ. Proceeding, assume w |= B(t : e ϕ). This means w |= 32(t : e ϕ), which itself means
But it follows from u |= t : e ϕ by Explicit Factivity that u |= Ec ϕ . Hence
But this means w |= 32Ec ϕ , which means w |= B(Ec ϕ ), which means w |= B e ϕ. Conclusion: |= B(t : e ϕ) ⇒ B e ϕ. Arguments for the other validities are similar.
• |= B e ϕ ⇒ Bϕ, |= 2 e ϕ ⇒ 2ϕ, and |= K e ϕ ⇒ Kϕ.
These follow by our abbreviations using Evidential Goodness (Definition 3
The Internalization Property of Justification Logics [5, 10] manifests itself in various ways within the context of our framework. A proper discussion of this important property and its manifestations in our setting requires that we study other things first (including a proof system for our logic). Accordingly, we shall postpone the description and discussion of Internalization until §6.1, at which point we will be in a position to proceed.
Examples

The Gettier Example: Explicitly Justified True Belief Without Knowledge
This example is due to Edmund Gettier [31] . Our (anonymous) agent has a justified belief that Jones owns a Ford: indeed, she has seen Jones driving a Ford, Jones told her that it is his car and showed her the car ownership papers, etc. Let us denote by f that statement that "Jones owns a Ford" and by c f the totality of the evidence in favor of f possessed by our agent: c f looks pretty conclusive, and indeed if it were legitimate, then it would certainly support f . So our agent accepts this evidence (believes it to be good): B(Ec f ) (i.e., B e f ). However, unknown to the agent, her evidence c f is not legitimate: the car papers are fake and in fact Jones does not own a Ford (but only borrowed one from a friend). So (in the actual world) the evidence c f is not conclusive and f is in fact false.
Let b denote the sentence "Brown is in Barcelona." By conscious logical inference, our agent comes to the (explicit) justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona": we have B e (b ∨ f ). But she has no evidence whatsoever about Brown: her justification for believing b ∨ f is only based on her belief about Jones.
In reality, unknown to the agent, Brown really is in Barcelona, so her belief in b ∨ f turns out to be true (i.e., correct). But is this justified true belief "knowledge"?
Formalization and Analysis of the Gettier Example
A model for this situation is pictured in Figure 1 . Here we have four possible worlds, one world w A for each A ⊆ {b, f }, with the obvious valuation for atomic sentences p ∈ {b, f } =: Φ (given by w A |= p iff p ∈ A). The actual world is w {b} (since Brown is in Barcelona and Jones does not own a Ford). Since the agent believes f , her most plausible worlds are w {f,b} and w {f } , while the worlds w {b} and w ∅ are strictly less plausible. Further, since she has no evidence for or against b, she considers the worlds w {f,b} and w {f } to be equally plausible, and the same goes for the worlds w {b} and w ∅ . To formalize the agent's explicit reasoning, we define E as in Figure 1 (where c is included in order to satisfy Trivial Evidence, Definition 3.1).
One can check that, in the actual world w {b} , the following statements hold:
). So our agent has an explicitly justified true belief in b ∨ f based on the argument c f ⇒b∨f · c f . However, it is easy to see that this is not "knowledge" according to our definition. Indeed, we have ¬2 e (b ∨ f ), and moreover we have ¬2(b ∨ f ): the agent's explicit belief in b ∨ f is not explicit knowledge, and in fact the agent does not even have implicit knowledge of b ∨ f . This is confirmed by the defeasibility analysis: the actual world satisfies ¬f ∧ ¬B e (f ∨ b|¬f ) ∧ ¬B(f ∨ b|¬f ). In other words, if our agent would learn that Jones in fact does not own a Ford (¬f ), then she will lose (both her explicit and her implicit) belief in f ∨ b.
The Fermat Example: Explicitly Justified True Belief, and Implicit Knowledge, Without Explicit Knowledge
Our agent has a justified belief in the truth of Fermat's Last Theorem: indeed, she has the testimony of her math teacher, who she believes to be an infallible expert in Mathematics and who announced to her that Fermat's Last Theorem has been proved. Our agent is a good math student, and in fact she happens to know all the axiom schemes and rules of (classical) Logic and Set Theory that are needed for proving Fermat's Last Theorem, but she has no other evidence pertaining to Fermat's Last Theorem. In fact, she has never read or heard anything at all about Fermat's Last Theorem except for what she heard from her teacher, and she has not come across this theorem in her own private thinking or study. Our agent's belief in the truth of Fermat's Last Theorem is correct: Fermat's Last Theorem has indeed been proved by Andrew Wiles [60] . Moreover, this belief is justified by her belief in the mathematical infallibility of her teacher, which we assume to be also justified by the testimony of her mathematically knowledgeable friends (several of whom have warmly recommended the teacher as an infallible Math expert). However, unknown both to our agent and to her mathematically knowledgeable friends, the teacher is not infallible: in fact, his expertise in Math is very thin, most of his mathematical claims are just random guesses, and in particular he has no clue about whether Fermat's Last Theorem has been proved.
We let f denote the statement "Fermat's Last Theorem is true," we let a denote the statement "the math teacher announced f to be true," and we let i denote the statement "the math teacher is an infallible source of mathematical truths." The lattermost statement means that the teacher only announces true mathematical statements. (Such infallibility would presumably imply that the teacher knows what he is talking about when he makes mathematical pronouncements, so that, among other things, he does not make random guesses about whether certain mathematical statements are true).
Our agent has direct perceptual evidence c a in favor of a (since she heard the teacher making the claim that f is true) and has some evidence c i in favor of i (indeed, the teacher has been recommended to her by several mathematically knowledgable friends as an expert in math). She thus accepts these pieces of evidence c a and c i . She also knows (based on common sense) that a ⇒ (i ⇒ f ); that is, if the teacher announced that the Fermat's Last Theorem is true and he is indeed an infallible source of mathematical truths, then the theorem must be true. Let us denote by c a⇒(i⇒f ) this common-sense justification. Using basic logic, our agent can indeed construct a justification for her belief in f in terms of her evidence c a , c i , and c a⇒(i⇒f ) . But is this explicitly justified true belief "knowledge"?
Formalization and Analysis of the Fermat Example
Like everything else in mathematics, Wiles' proof of Fermat's Last Theorem can in principle be fully formalized in any of the standard axiomatic systems of Set Theory. 8 We adopt the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel system ZFC, based on infinitely many axioms (produced recursively as instances of finitely many axiom schemas). To avoid the need for the Universal Generalization Rule, we adopt as a background logic a version of classical First-Order Logic (FOL) that uses Modus Ponens as the only inference rule. For this, one needs to close the set of axioms under universal quantification: if ϕ is an axiom then ∀xϕ is also an axiom. Let A ZFC be the set of all axioms of ZFC, assumed to include some complete set of axioms for FOL and to be closed under universal quantification. This set is of course infinite. But note that every proof π is ZFC uses only some finite subset A π ⊆ A ZFC of these axioms, together with Modus Ponens ("from F ⇒ G and G, derive G") as the only inference rule.
Let L ZFC be the language of ZFC, and let χ k k∈N be an effective enumeration of all formulas in L ZFC . Choose m such that χ m is an appropriate translation of Fermat's Last Theorem into L ZFC . We define our set Φ of propositional letters as the set of symbols given by
We let f k denote the statement "χ k is true." For convenience, we define f := f m , so f says that Fermat's Last Theorem is true. As before, a says that the math teacher announced f to be true, and i says that the math teacher is an infallible source of mathematical truths.
We say that a certificate c ϕ "encodes an axiom" to mean that ϕ = f k for some k ∈ N such that χ k is an axiom of ZFC (i.e., χ k ∈ A ZFC ). If c f k encodes an axiom, then the L ZFC -formula χ k is "the axiom encoded by c ϕ ."
We define what it means for a term t to "encode a proof of χ k " by the following induction:
(I) if c ϕ encodes the axiom χ k , then c ϕ encodes a proof of χ k ; (II) if u encodes a proof of χ j , the formula χ j is the implication χ k ⇒ χ in L ZFC , and v encodes a proof of
encodes a proof of χ ; 9
(III) nothing else encodes a proof (of any χ k ).
It follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence Pr that matches each proof π k in ZFC of a formula χ k ∈ L ZFC with a term Pr(π k ) ∈ T such that:
• Pr(π k ) encodes a proof of χ k , and
Finally, we fix a proof π * in ZFC of χ m (Fermat's Last Theorem) that represents a ZFC formalization of Wiles' proof, and define s := Pr(π * ). The term s is obviously very complicated and it is therefore not reasonable to assume that our agent is explicitly aware of it. Let A ZFC be the set of all certificates c ϕ ∈ T that encode a proof, and let
The latter is a finite set consisting of all the terms encoding axiom instances that are used in the proof π * . We will assume that all the terms in A π * are explicitly available to our student: this realizes our above-mentioned informal assumption that the student "knows all the axiom schemes and rules of (classical) Logic and Set Theory that are needed for proving Fermat's Last Theorem." Our model for this scenario, pictured in Figure 2 , consists of two worlds v and w, with the valuation given by
a = {v, w}; and i = {w}. Note that f = f m = {v, w} because χ m (Fermat's Last Theorem) is provable in ZFC (via the ZFC formalization π * of Wiles' proof). The actual world in Figure 2 is v (at which i is false, since the teacher is not actually an infallible source of mathematical truths), but our agent considers world w to be more plausible than v, so she mistakenly believes i. To represent our agent's reasoning, we define E as in Figure 2 (where c is included in order to satisfy Trivial Evidence, Definition 3.1). Since the agent at least knows all the axioms schemes and rules of ZFC that are needed for the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem, we assume that the contents of a finite set A satisfying A π * ⊆ A ⊆ A ZFC are explicitly known to her.
One can check that in the actual world v the following statements hold: B e a, B e i, B e (i ⇒ f ), B((c a⇒(i⇒f ) ·c a ) : e (i ⇒ f )), B((c i⇒f ·c i ) : e f ), B e f , and f . In other words, the agent has constructed a chain of evidence that provides an explicit justification for her explicit belief in f , and moreover this belief is correct.
Furthermore, unlike in the Gettier Example, the agent of the present example has implicit defeasible knowledge of f . Indeed, 2f holds in the real world v because f holds in all worlds: Fermat's Last Theorem is after all equivalent to a mathematical tautology. In fact, since our agent knows the axiom schemes and rules of ZFC and how to correctly reason in ZFC, Fermat's Last Theorem really follows from evidence that she actually possesses: the complicated logical term s (encoding a correct proof of Fermat's Last Theorem) really does support f , and s is constructible (in principle) using certificates c ϕ ∈ A that are all in the agent's possession.
Nevertheless, the agent still does not have explicit knowledge of f ; that is, we have v |= 2 e f . This is because she is not able to actually construct (or even understand) the argument s, whose proof is way too complex for her to follow. So s / ∈ E(v) ∪ E(w). The fact that her explicit justified belief in f is not explicit knowledge is witnessed by the fact that we have v |= B e (f |¬i). That is, if she were to learn that the teacher is a not an infallible source of mathematical truth, then she would lose her explicit belief in Fermat's Last Theorem! (Though since she does have implicit knowledge of Fermat's Last Theorem, she would nevertheless continue to have an implicit belief in it; that is, v |= B(f |¬i).)
Omniscience
Formal models of epistemic and doxastic logic often ascribe "too much" knowledge (or belief) to agents. 10 Whether an ascription of knowledge or belief is "too much" depends on one's philosophical views. To list just a few objections one might raise, let us associate with a pre-model (M, w) and a propositional attitude symbol X ∈ {B, B e , 2, 2 e , K, K e } the set X(M, w) := {ϕ ∈ F | w |= M Xϕ} of formulas about which the agent has the attitude denoted by X. As before, B is implicit belief, B e is explicit belief, 2 is implicit (defeasible) knowledge, 2 e is explicit (defeasible) knowledge, K is implicit possession of information, and K e is explicit possession of information. Here are just a few potentially worrying properties that the agent's knowledge or belief may satisfy.
• (Sentential) Logical Omniscience (see, e.g., [26, pp. 310-313] ): the agent's knowledge or belief (set) is closed under a logical principle P . (Examples of P : "the agent knows all valid formulas," or "if the agent knows both ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ, then the agent also knows ψ.")
This might be worrisome because "real agents" (e.g., humans, animals, and computers), as opposed to the "formal agents" we talk about for most of this paper, are generally logically non-omniscient: they (for a number of reasons) generally do not turn their minds to all possible logical consequences of their knowledge or beliefs and therefore cannot reasonably be construed to know or believe all such consequences.
• (Sentential) Algorithmic Omniscience (see, e.g., [34] ): the agent's knowledge or belief (set) is not computable.
This might be worrisome for someone who holds the view that "real agents" cannot know something that cannot be computed by a Turing Machine.
• (Sentential) Computational Omniscience (see, e.g., [11] ): the agent's knowledge or belief (set) includes a validity ϕ whose shortest derivation in a given theory T exceeds some computational bound defined in terms of the size of ϕ (e.g., the shortest T -derivation of ϕ is not polynomialtime computable in the number of symbols that make up ϕ).
This might be worrisome for someone who holds the view that "real agents" who reason in accordance with T (in some suitable sense) cannot perform computations that fall outside of a given class of "reasonably sized" computational problems.
• (Sentential) Non-finitism (see, e.g., [15, 25, 40, 49] ): the agent's knowledge or belief (set) is infinite.
This might be we worrisome for someone who holds the view that "real agents" (in light of their finite existence, finite memory, or finite computation or "thinking" speed, or for other reasons) cannot arrive in a state where they have gone to the trouble to come to know an infinite number of things.
• (Sentential) Non-ultrafinitism (see, e.g., [49, 53] ): the agent's knowledge or belief (set) is not limited by a fixed finite bound N (e.g., the number of subatomic particles in the universe).
This might be worrisome for someone who holds the view that "real agents" (in light of their finite resources or in light of fundamental limitations in the universe) have a fixed fundamental informational limitation.
In our framework, implicit attitudes of belief, knowledge, and information suffer from all of these properties. However, our explicit notions can be controlled (by careful definition of the goodevidence availability function E) to avoid each of these properties if it is so desired. 11 For example, one might reasonably argue that our model for the Gettier Example (Figure 1 ) avoids omniscience that is logical (at least for P 's that imply all validities are known or believed), algorithmic, or computational in nature; further, this model certainly satisfies both finitism and ultrafinitism. Our model for the Fermat Example (Figure 2 ), on the other hand, may be problematic when it comes to ultrafinitism; however, it might reasonably be argued that it avoids the other properties we have mentioned.
Our overall point is the following: our framework, similar to "awareness structures" in general [26, 35] , is sufficiently flexible to address a wide range of philosophical views on omniscience. However, unlike simple awareness structures, our framework not only addresses omniscience but does so from the perspective of explicit evidence-based reasoning. Our work therefore contributes to the general study of logical omniscience in Justification Logic [11, 27, 30, 41, 42, 50, 58, 59] . In particular, we suggest a "new" kind of omniscience:
• Justification (or Proof ) Omniscience: the evidence (set E(w)) actually available to the agent (at a world w) satisfies a property P of evidence (sets) that is analogous to a property P of knowledge or belief (sets) used in defining a particular notion of Sentential Omniscience (such as the notions listed above). Justification Omniscience therefore comes in various versions depending on the choice of property P . Examples: P is the property that "E(w) is closed under any correct application of the Modus Ponens operation s · t," P is the property that "E(w) is not computable," P is the property that "E(w) is not finite," or P is the property that "E(w) is not ultrafinite."
Justification Omniscience might be worrisome for someone who holds the view that the range of justifications that are actually available to "real agents" is limited for a reason corresponding to P (and is essentially the same reason for finding P -Sentential Omniscience to be worrisome). For example, if P is the property that "E(w) is not finite" (so that P is the property that "a knowledge or belief set is not finite"), then the worry with P -Justification Omniscience, just as with P -Sentential Omniscience (i.e., Non-finitism), is that "real agents" (in light of their finite existence, finite memory, or finite computation or "thinking" speed, or for other reasons) cannot arrive in a state where they have gone to the trouble to come to know an infinite number of things (where "things" means "justifications" in the case of P -Justification Omniscience and "sentences" in the case of P -Sentential Omniscience).
Our logic can be made (via suitable restrictions on E) to realize (or violate) variants of justification non-omniscience. Our syntax can be used to spell out the specific restrictions one has in mind by writing whichever of Et or ¬Et is desired for those terms t that encode correct justifications of assertions ϕ (i.e., for which t ϕ). We note that the underlying intuitive reason for the failure of a form of Sentential Omniscience is that real agents cannot do the work required to "derive all the justifications" for the many things they might possibly know were they to be able to turn their mind in the proper way to the many sentences they might otherwise know or believe. This intuitive rationale for the failure of Sentential Omniscience forms the actual definition of Justification (or Proof) Omniscience. Therefore, in explaining the reason why a certain kind of Sentential Omniscience might be worrisome, it is natural to posit a specific kind of Justification (or Proof) Omniscience as the underlying rationale: the reason why it is worrisome to think that the agent can know or believe all the sentences satisfying a sentential property P (i.e., that she is P -Sententially Omniscient) is that it is worrisome to think that she can "form all the justifications" satisfying the corresponding evidential property P (i.e., that she is P -Justification Omniscient).
Finally, we note that while "awareness structures" [26, 35] can express all forms of Sentential Omniscience, they cannot express Justification Omniscience. For this, something like our goodevidence availability map E is needed.
Proof System
Definition 6.1 (Theory). JBG, the theory of justified belief with evidential goodness, is defined in Table 2 .
Axiom Schemes
Ec ϕ ⇒ ϕ Information: S5 axioms for K Defeasible Knowledge: S4 axioms for 2 Indefeasibility: Proof. Soundness (i.e., ϕ implies |= ϕ) is a straightforward argument by induction on the length of derivation. We focus on the completeness argument ( ϕ implies |= ϕ). We proceed by way of a canonical model argument.
Define the canonical structure Ω := (W Ω , · Ω , ∼ Ω , ≥ Ω , E Ω ) in the usual way. That is, W Ω is the set of all maximal JBG-consistent sets of formulas,
The Truth Lemma (i.e., the statement that ϕ ∈ Γ iff (Ω, Γ) |= ϕ for each formula ϕ) is then proved by induction on formula construction. The cases for atomic formulas, Boolean connectives, and modal formulas Kϕ and 2ϕ follow by standard modal reasoning [16] ; all that remains are the cases for formulas t ϕ and Et.
• Truth Lemma: case for formulas t ϕ.
We have t ϕ ∈ Γ iff t ϕ by our definition of W Ω and the axiomatization of JBG. We have t ϕ iff t ϕ by the Admissibility axiom of JBG. We have t ϕ iff (Ω, Γ) |= t ϕ by the definition of the satisfaction relation |=.
• Truth Lemma: case for formulas Et.
We have Et ∈ Γ iff t ∈ E Ω (Γ) by the definition of E Ω . We have t ∈ E Ω (Γ) iff (Ω, Γ) |= Et by the definition of the satisfaction relation |=.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. Using standard modal reasoning [16] , one can then show that ∼ is an equivalence relation and ≥ is a preorder and that Ω satisfies Local Connectedness and Indefeasibility. Further, we have each of the following.
• Ω satisfies Trivial Evidence: c ∈ E Ω (Γ).
By the Trivial Evidence axiom, the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ, and the definition of E Ω .
• Ω satisfies Certification of Evidence: if t ∈ E Ω (Γ) and t ϕ, then c ϕ ∈ E Ω (Γ).
Suppose t ∈ E Ω (Γ) and t ϕ. It follows from t ∈ E Ω (Γ) by the definition of E Ω that Et ∈ Γ. It follows from t ϕ by the Admissibility axiom that t ϕ ∈ Γ. But then Ec ϕ ∈ Γ by the Certification of Evidence axiom and the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ, and hence c ϕ ∈ E Ω (Γ) by the definition of E Ω .
• Ω satisfies Subterm Closure: if • denotes either of the symbols + or · and t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ), then t, s ∈ E Ω (Γ).
Suppose t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ). It follows that E(t • s) ∈ Γ by the definition of E Ω and hence that Et, Es ∈ Γ by the Subterm Closure axiom and the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ. But then t, s ∈ E Ω (Γ) by the definition of E Ω .
• Ω satisfies Availability of Evidence: if • denotes either of the symbols + or ·, t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ), Γ ∼ Ω Γ , and t, s ∈ E Ω (Γ ), then t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ ).
Assume t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ), Γ ∼ Ω Γ , and t, s ∈ E Ω (Γ ). Applying the definition of E Ω , it follows from the first assumption that E(t • s) ∈ Γ and from the third that Et, Es ∈ Γ . Since E(t • s) ∈ Γ, it follows by the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ and the Availability of Evidence axiom that
But it follows from Et ∧ Es ⇒ E(t • s) ∈ Γ and Et, Es ∈ Γ by the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ that E(t • s) ∈ Γ , and the latter implies t • s ∈ E Ω (Γ ) by the definition of E Ω .
• Ω satisfies Evidential Goodness: c ϕ ∈ E Ω (Γ) implies Γ |= ϕ.
Suppose c ϕ ∈ E Ω (Γ). Applying the definition of E Ω , we have that Ec ϕ ∈ Γ and hence that ϕ ∈ Γ by the Evidential Goodness axiom and the maximal JBG-consistency of Γ. But it follows from ϕ ∈ Γ by the Truth Lemma that Γ |= ϕ.
We have shown that Ω is a model. We now fix a formula ϕ for which ¬ϕ. Clearly, we may extend {¬ϕ} by way of a Lindenbaum argument [16] to a maximal JBG-consistent set Γ * ∈ W Ω and then we have (Ω, Γ * ) |= ϕ by the Truth Lemma. Unfortunately, this does not show that |= ϕ because the canonical structure Ω, while a model, need not be a standard model. So it will now be our task to produce a standard pointed model at which ϕ does not hold. This will then show that |= ϕ and thereby complete the proof.
Define Ω to be the submodel of Ω obtained removing all worlds not ∼ Ω -connected to Γ * and restricting the other components of Ω to the remaining worlds. That is, Ω :
, and E Ω (Γ) := E Ω (Γ) for each Γ ∈ W Ω . Note that ∼ Ω is universal ; that is, ∼ Ω = W Ω × W Ω . Furthermore, transitioning from Ω to Ω preserves satisfaction: for each formula ψ and world Γ ∈ W Ω , we have (Ω , Γ) |= ψ iff (Ω, Γ) |= ψ. It follows that Ω is a model (though not necessarily a standard model) and (Ω , Γ * ) |= ϕ.
For each formula θ ∈ F , define the set rsub(θ) of recursive subformulas of θ according to the following induction: rsub( ) := { }, rsub(p) := {p} for each p ∈ Φ, rsub(¬θ) := {¬θ} ∪ rsub(θ), rsub(θ 1 ∧θ 2 ) := {θ 1 ∧θ 2 }∪rsub(θ 1 )∪rsub(θ 2 ), rsub(Kθ) := {Kθ}∪rsub(θ), rsub(2θ) := {2θ}∪rsub(θ),
rsub(χ) , and
Define the language L 
of the terms t i+1 and the set F ϕ i+1 of formulas θ i+1 defined by the following grammar:
where θ i ∈ F 
∼ is "smallest filtration" given by
≥ is the transitive filtration given by
and We wish to show that E satisfies the more convenient equality
To prove this, we need to show that
Proceeding, assume that
We show that M satisfies Trivial Evidence. Choose a [Γ] ∈ W (we wish to show that c ∈ E([Γ])). Since Ω satisfies Trivial Evidence, we have c ∈ E Ω (Γ). Further, since c ∈ T We now show that M satisfies Certification of Evidence. Proceeding, we assume t ∈ E([Γ]) and t ψ (and we wish to show that c ψ ∈ E([Γ])). Since t ∈ E([Γ]) = T * ∩ E Ω (Γ), it follows from the assumption t ψ and the result at the end of the previous paragraph that c ψ ∈ T * . Also, since Ω satisfies Certification of Evidence, t ∈ E Ω (Γ) and t ψ together imply that c ψ ∈ E Ω (Γ). Hence
We now show that M satisfies Subterm Closure. Proceeding, we take • to be either of the symbols + or · and assume that t • s ∈ E([Γ]) (with our goal being to show that t, s ∈ E([Γ])).
, the set T * is closed under subterms, and Ω satisfies Subterm Closure (so that t, s ∈ E Ω ([Γ])). The result follows.
We now show that M satisfies Availability of Evidence. Proceeding, we take • to be either of the symbols + or · and assume
, and t, s ∈ E([∆]) (with our goal being to show
Since ∼ Ω is universal, we also have Γ ∼ Ω ∆. But Ω satisfies Availability of Evidence and therefore
, which is what we wished to show.
∼ is an equivalence relation because it is universal, and ≥ is a preorder because we took the transitive filtration of a reflexive relation and 2 is S4 [21, pp. 105-107]. Indefeasibility follows by the universality of ∼.
To see that M satisfies Local Connectedness (i.e., that
. It follows by the meaning of (per the negation of the definition of ≥) that there are formulas 2ψ, 2ψ ∈ F * such that 2ψ ∈ Γ, 2ψ / ∈ ∆, 2ψ ∈ ∆, and 2ψ / ∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma (and the preservation of the satisfaction relation in going from Ω to Ω ), we have (Ω , Γ) |= 2ψ ∧ ¬2ψ and (Ω , ∆) |= 2ψ ∧ ¬2ψ. Since ≥ Ω is transitive, it follows that (Ω , Γ) |= 22ψ ∧ ¬2ψ and (Ω , ∆) |= 22ψ ∧ ¬2ψ. There therefore exist worlds Γ ≤ Ω Γ and ∆ ≤ Ω ∆ such that (Ω , Γ ) |= 2ψ ∧ ¬ψ and (Ω , ∆ ) |= 2ψ ∧ ¬ψ. Since ∼ Ω is universal, we have Γ ∼ Ω Γ and Γ ∼ Ω ∆ . But then (Ω , Γ ) |= K(2ψ ⇒ ψ )∨K(2ψ ⇒ ψ), from which it follows by the Truth Lemma (and the preservation of satisfaction in going from Ω to Ω ) that K(2ψ ⇒ ψ ) ∨ K(2ψ ⇒ ψ) / ∈ Γ . But the latter contradicts the maximal consistency of Γ because K(2ψ ⇒ ψ ) ∨ K(2ψ ⇒ ψ) is the Local Connectedness axiom. Conclusion: our original assumption (that M does not satisfy Local Connectedness) was incorrect, and hence M does in fact satisfy Local Connectedness.
We have proved that M is a pre-model. Further, it follows immediately from the finiteness of M that M satisfies standardness. So M is a standard pre-model.
We now prove the Filtration Lemma: for each [Γ] ∈ W and each ψ ∈ F * , we have (M, [Γ]) |= ψ iff (Ω , Γ) |= ψ. The argument is by induction on the construction of ψ ∈ F * . The cases for atomic formulas, Boolean connectives, and modal formulas Kϕ and 2ϕ follow by standard filtration arguments [21, pp. 101-102] . All that remains are the cases for formulas t ψ ∈ F * and Et ∈ F * .
• Filtration Lemma: case for formulas t ψ ∈ F * .
(M, [Γ]) |= t ψ means t ψ, which is what it means to have (Ω , Γ) |= t ψ.
• Filtration Lemma: case for formulas Et ∈ F * .
Conversely, assume (Ω , Γ) |= Et, which means that t ∈ E Ω (Γ). Since this case assumes Et ∈ F * = F A standard pre-model satisfying Evidential Goodness is a standard model. So we have shown that M is a standard model. Further, it follows from (Ω , Γ * ) |= ϕ and ϕ ∈ F * by the Filtration Lemma that (M, [Γ * ]) |= ϕ.
Corollary 6.3. The satisfiability problem for JBG is decidable.
Internalization
The Internalization Property of a Justification Logic states that for every provable formula ϕ, there exists a term t such that t : ϕ is also provable [10] . Intuitively, this property says that the Justification Logic is "aware of" (or "internalizes") its own proofs, by which we mean that any proof of ϕ may be represented as a term t to which the logic accords status as justification for ϕ (i.e., t : ϕ is also provable).
Our logic also satisfies Internalization, though our broader language allows us to state a number of different kinds of Internalization. We state these in Theorems 6.7 and 6.9 after considering a few preliminary matters.
Definition 6.4 (Necessitated Axioms and Logical Terms).
A necessitated axiom is a formula of the form
where each X i ∈ {2, K} and ϕ is a JBG-axiom. A necessitated non-axiom is a formula of the form (17) for which n is maximal (i.e., ϕ is not itself of the form Xψ for some X ∈ {2, K} and formula ψ) and ϕ is not a JBG-axiom. The set of logical terms is the smallest set that contains certificates c ϕ for each necessitated axiom ϕ and is closed under the evidence-combining operation t, s → t · s.
Definition 6.5. We write , n ϕ to mean that ϕ is derivable in at most lines using exactly n necessitations (for 2 or for K) of a necessitated non-axiom. (The necessitation rule for X is "from θ, derive Xθ.") We write * ϕ to mean that , 0 ϕ for some ≥ 1.
Lemma 6.6 (Necessitation Elimination). For each ϕ ∈ F , we have ϕ iff * ϕ.
Proof. * ϕ implies ϕ. So it suffices for us to prove by induction on n with a sub-induction on that , n ϕ implies * , 0 ϕ for some * ≥ 1 (which means * ϕ).
• Base case: n = 0. The result follows immediately.
• Induction step: assume the result holds for fewer than n necessitations of necessitated nonaxioms (the "induction hypothesis"), prove it holds for exactly n necessitations of necessitated non-axioms.
Sub-induction base: = 1. We have 1, n ϕ iff ϕ is an axiom. Therefore, 1, 0 ϕ.
Sub-induction step: assume the result holds for fewer than lines (the "sub-induction hypothesis"), prove it holds for exactly lines. We are to show that , n ϕ implies * , 0 ϕ for some * ≥ 1. So assume , n ϕ. This implies ϕ can be proved in lines or fewer using exactly n necessitations of necessitated non-axioms, and therefore (by adding extraneous axioms to the beginning of the proof) ϕ can be proved in exactly lines using exactly n necessitations of necessitated non-axioms. That is, we have a proof
that uses exactly n necessitations of a necessitated non-axiom. Let π be the longest prefix of π such that π = θ 1 , . . . , θ −1 , Xθ m and m ≤ − 1 ≤ − 1
and Xθ m is a necessitated non-axiom. That is, π is the longest prefix of π such that last line of π follows by necessitation of a necessitated non-axiom appearing on an earlier line in π . Now either π is a proper prefix of π (and hence < ) or π = π (and hence = ). Let us consider each case in turn.
Case: π is a proper prefix of π. Hence < and π = π .σ for some finite sequence σ of formulas (here "." denotes sequence concatenation), and so we may apply the sub-induction hypothesis: there exists an * ≥ 1 such that * , 0 Xθ m . But then we have an at most * -line proof π * of Xθ m that uses no necessitations of necessitated non-axioms, and therefore π * .σ is an at most ( * + |σ|)-line proof of ϕ (here |σ| denotes the length of sequence |σ|) that uses no necessitations of necessitated non-axioms (by the fact that π was the longest prefix of π ending in a necessitation of a necessitated non-axiom). That is, * + |σ|, 0 ϕ, as desired.
Case: π = π. Hence = and ϕ = Xθ m with m ≤ − 1. By the definition of π (as the longest prefix of π such that last line of π follows by necessitation of a necessitated non-axiom appearing on an earlier line in π ), it follows that θ m is a necessitated non-axiom. It therefore follows that θ m must have been derived by MP from θ n ⇒ θ m and θ n and that the lines at which θ n ⇒ θ m and θ n appear in π = π come before line m. That is, π has a prefix π m that has one of the following two forms:
π m = σ 1 , θ n ⇒ θ m , σ 2 , θ n , σ 3 , θ m (19) where the σ i 's are placeholders for finite (possibly empty) sequences of formulas. Let us first assume that π m has form (18) . It follows by use of necessitation for X that we have proofs π 1 = σ 1 , θ n , Xθ n π 2 = σ 1 , θ n , σ 2 , θ n ⇒ θ m , X(θ n ⇒ θ m )
where the length |π 1 | of π 1 and the length |π 2 | of π 2 satisfy
Lemma 6.8 (Certification). For each pointed pre-model (M, w), formula ϕ ∈ F , and propositional attitude symbol X ∈ {B, 2, K}:
w |= X(c ϕ : ϕ) iff w |= X(t : ϕ) for some t w |= X(c ϕ : e ϕ) iff w |= X(t : e ϕ) for some t
Proof. The left-to-right directions are obvious, so we only address the right-to-left directions. For implicit belief (X = B), we assume w |= B(t : ϕ). This means ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= t : ϕ .
We have |= t : ϕ ⇒ ϕ by Factivity (Proposition 3.12); also, we have c ϕ ϕ (by Definition 2.2) and c θ ∈sub(cϕ) θ = ϕ (because sub(c ϕ ) = {c ϕ }). Therefore, applying (22) and the meaning of c ϕ : ϕ (Definition 2.6), it follows that ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= c ϕ : ϕ .
But this means w |= B(c ϕ : ϕ). For explicit belief (X = B e ), we assume w |= B(t : e ϕ). This means ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= t :
which itself means ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= Et ∧ t : ϕ .
Since |= t : ϕ ⇒ t ϕ (Definition 2.6), it follows from w |= Et by Certification of Evidence (Definition 3.1) and the definition of satisfaction that w |= Ec ϕ . Also, it follows by our argument for the implicit case that u |= t : ϕ implies u |= c ϕ : ϕ. Therefore, we have shown that ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= Ec ϕ ∧ c ϕ : ϕ ,
which is what it means to have w |= B(c ϕ : e ϕ). For X = 2, change the quantifiers "∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v" in the argument for implicit belief to "∀v ≤ w" and the B's to 2's. For X = K, change the quantifiers in the argument for implicit belief to "∀v ∼ w" and the B's to K's. Theorem 6.9 (Knowledge and Belief Internalization). For each pointed model (M, w), formula ϕ ∈ F , and propositional attitude symbol X ∈ {B, 2, K}:
w |= Xϕ iff w |= X(t : ϕ) for some t w |= X e ϕ iff w |= X(t : e ϕ) for some t Proof. For implicit belief, w |= Bϕ means ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= ϕ .
Since c ϕ ϕ and c θ ∈sub(cϕ) θ = ϕ, we have (27) iff ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= c ϕ : ϕ .
But this means w |= B(c ϕ : ϕ), which is equivalent by Lemma 6.8 to the statement that w |= B(t : ϕ) for some term t. For explicit belief, w |= B e ϕ means w |= B(Ec ϕ ), which means ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= Ec ϕ .
Since M is a model and therefore satisfies Evidential Goodness, we have (29) iff ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= Ec ϕ ∧ ϕ .
Since c ϕ ϕ and c θ ∈sub(cϕ) θ = ϕ, we have (30) iff ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= Ec ϕ ∧ c ϕ : ϕ .
But (31) is what it means to have ∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v : u |= c ϕ :
But this means w |= B(c ϕ : e ϕ), which, by Lemma 6.8, is equivalent to the statement that w |= B(t : e ϕ) for some term t. For X = 2 and X = 2 e , change the quantifiers "∃v ≤ w.∀u ≤ v" to "∀v ≤ w," change the B's to 2's, and change the B e 's to 2 e 's. For X = K and X = K e , change the quantifiers to "∀v ∼ w," change the B's to K's, and change the B e 's to K e 's.
Conclusion and Relationship with Previous Work
We have presented a complete, decidable logic of justifiable belief, defeasible knowledge, and explicit justification based on conclusive evidence. We have explained and demonstrated by way of example how this logic can be used to reason about Gettier-type situations [31] , while addressing various kinds of omniscience. This paper is closely connected with the authors' previous work [13] , in which we studied similar evidence-based notions but in a framework that did not require the notion of conclusive evidence. In addition to imposing Evidential Goodness, we have also simplified matters here by leaving out the dynamics and focusing on the single-agent case. This allows us to highlight at the most basic level the way in which we adapt the evidential reasoning mechanisms of Justification Logic [10] to develop a particular theory of evidence-based (static) belief revision. (See [13] and the references therein for a discussion of the difference between static and dynamic notions of belief revision.) events along the lines the authors studied previously [13] except with the condition of Evidential Goodness in place. Another possibility is to look to connections with recent work by van Benthem and Pacuit [57] studying a theory of "evidence management" that provides a different, semantic approach to evidence that nevertheless may have natural connections with our work here. Yet another possibility is to look to possible connections with the Justification Logic-based belief revision work of Studer and Kuznets [56] , which provides a new account of the connection between public announcements and evidence introduction.
Finally, while the notion of evidence considered here has a strong connection with proofs (as is the case for Justification Logics in general [3, 10] ), there are other natural notions of evidence that one may consider, and these suggest other operations on evidence beyond the proof-related ones we considered here. In this sense, we are currently working on a number of promising ideas, which were all anticipated in the comments of one of our anonymous referees. The first is to expand our setting by connecting it to the philosophical literature that uses default logic and non-monotonic logics to deal with doxastic justification (see, e.g., [36, 37] ). For instance, the certificates c ϕ may be interpreted as defaults, supporting the conclusion ϕ only in "normal" circumstances. Alternatively, in addition to Artemov's operation t · s (which builds complex proofs by applying Modus Ponens with respect to classical implication), one may consider a new operation t ⊗ s that builds complex doxastic justifications by applying Modus Ponens with respect to the (non-monotonic) doxastic conditionals (as captured in our logic by conditional beliefs). Another idea is to connect to Bayesian epistemology [38] by providing a probabilistic semantics for justification. This suggests even more operations on evidence that correspond to more quantitative forms of evidence management. We think both these lines of research will be useful in analyzing the so-called "No False Lemma" Gettier counterexamples [39] , which are currently beyond the grasp of our setting.
